Add design diagrams (#2332)

book/src/SUMMARY.md

@@ -66,8 +66,10 @@
 - [Design Documents]()
   - [Access Profiles 2022](developers/designs/access_profiles_rework_2022.md)
   - [Access Profiles Original](developers/designs/access_profiles_and_security.md)
+  - [Access Control Defaults](developers/designs/access_control_defaults.md)
   - [Architecture](developers/designs/architecture.md)
   - [Authentication flow](developers/designs/authentication_flow.md)
+  - [Domain Join](developers/designs/domain_join.md)
   - [Elevated Priv Mode](developers/designs/elevated_priv_mode.md)
   - [Oauth2 Refresh Tokens](developers/designs/oauth2_refresh_tokens.md)
   - [Replication Coordinator](developers/designs/replication_coord.md)

book/src/developers/designs/access_control_defaults.md

@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+# Access Control Defaults
+
+- Do we need some kind of permission atoms to allow certain tasks?
+
+## Use Cases:
+
+- User sign-up portal (need service account that can create users and do cred reset)
+- Role for service account generation.
+- Remote backup - this account should be able to trigger and retrieve a backup
+- Groups should be able to be changed by a managing group (managed by)
+- IP limits on accounts?
+
+- Users need to not be able to see other users.
+  - Means the user can't read member attr, but can see groups + group info.
+
+- Anonymous needs to be able to be blocked more easily.
+- Enable disable self-mail write
+- Enable disable self-name-change
+
+## To achieve
+
+- IP access limits
+- Managed By rules
+- Better group specification syntax (not filters)
+
+## Domain Admin
+
+```mermaid
+graph LR
+
+DomainAdmin("Domain Admin") --> AccessControlAdmin("Access Control Admin")
+DomainAdmin("Domain Admin") --> AccountPolicyAdmin("Account Policy Admin")
+DomainAdmin("Domain Admin") --> DomainConfigAdmin("Domain Config Admin")
+DomainAdmin("Domain Admin") --> HPGroupAdmin("HP Group Admin")
+DomainAdmin("Domain Admin") --> SchemaAdmin("Schema Admin")
+DomainAdmin("Domain Admin") --> SyncAccountAdmin("Sync Account Admin")
+```
+
+## IDM Admin
+
+```mermaid
+graph LR
+
+IdmAdmin("IDM Admin") --> GroupAdmin("Group Admin")
+IdmAdmin("IDM Admin") --> PersonAdmin("Person Admin")
+IdmAdmin("IDM Admin") --> PersonPIIModify("Person PII Modify")
+IdmAdmin("IDM Admin") --> PersonReadNoPII("Person Read No PII")
+IdmAdmin("IDM Admin") --> PosixAccountIncludesCredMod("POSIX Account - [Includes Cred Mod]")
+IdmAdmin("IDM Admin") --> RadiusAccountModify("Radius Account Modify")
+```
+
+## Integration Admin
+
+```mermaid
+graph LR
+
+IntegrationAdmin("Integration Admin") --> Oauth2Admin("Oauth2 Admin")
+IntegrationAdmin("Integration Admin") --> PosixAccountConsumer("POSIX Account Consumer")
+IntegrationAdmin("Integration Admin") --> RadiusServiceAdmin("Radius Service Admin")
+```
+
+## Help Desk
+
+```mermaid
+graph LR
+
+HelpDesk("Help Desk") --> PersonCredentialModify("Person Credential Modify")
+HelpDesk("Help Desk") --> PersonReadNoPII("Person Read No PII")
+```
+
+## Account "Self"
+
+```mermaid
+graph LR
+
+SelfMailModify("Self Mail Modify") --> |"Modifies"| Self
+SelfRead("Self Read") --> |"Read"| Self
+SelfModify("Self Modify") --> |"Writes Secrets"| Self
+SelfNameModify("Self Name Modify") --> |"Modifies"| Self
+```
+
+## Account-Related
+
+Duplicated for Service Accounts, HP persons, HP service Accounts.
+
+```mermaid
+graph LR
+
+PersonOnBoard("Person On Board") --> |"Creates"| Persons("Persons")
+PersonAdmin("Person Admin") --> |"Creates Deletes"| Persons("Persons")
+PersonPIIModify --> |"Reads Modifies"| Persons
+PersonPIIModify("Person PII Modify") -.-> |"Member of"| PersonAdmin
+PersonCredentialModify("Person Credential Modify") -.-> |"Member of"| PersonAdmin
+PersonCredentialModify("Person Credential Modify") -.-> |"Member of"| PersonOnBoard
+PersonCredentialModify --> |"Reads Modifies"| Persons
+PersonCredentialModify --> |"Reads"| PersonReadNoPII("Person Read No PII")
+PersonAdmin --> PersonReadWithPII("Person Read - With PII")
+PersonReadWithPII --> PersonReadNoPII
+PersonReadNoPII --> |"Reads"| Persons
+PosixAccountIncludesCredMod --> |"Extends (Add Posix Account)"| Persons
+```
+
+## Domain and Schema
+
+```mermaid
+graph LR
+
+DomainConfigAdmin("Domain Configuration Admin") --> |"Modifies Reads"| Domain
+DomainConfigAdmin("Domain Configuration Admin") --> |"Modifies Reads"| System
+SyncAccountAdmin("Sync Account Admin") --> |"Creates Modifies Deletes"| SyncAccounts("Sync Accounts")
+SchemaAdmin("Schema Admin") --> |"Creates Modifies"| Schema("Schema")
+AccessControlAdmin("Access Control Admin") --> |"Creates Modifies Deletes"| AccessControls("Access Controls")
+```
+
+## High-Priv and Groups
+
+```mermaid
+graph LR
+
+GroupAdmin("Group Admin") --> |"Create Modify Delete"| Groups("Groups")
+AccountPolicyAdmin("Account Policy Admin") --> |"Modifies Extends"| Groups("Groups")
+GroupAdmin --> |"Modify Delete"| HPGroups("HP Groups")
+GroupAdmin --> |"Add Members"| HPGroup("HP Group")
+
+HPGroupAdmin("HP Group Admin") --> HPGroup
+GroupAdmin -.-> |"Inherits"| HPGroupAdmin
+```
+
+## OAuth2 Specific
+
+```mermaid
+graph LR
+
+Oauth2Admin("Oauth2 Admin") --> |"Creates Modifies Delegates"| Oauth2RS("Oauth2 RS")
+ScopedMember("Scoped Member") --> |"Reads"| Oauth2RS
+```
+
+## POSIX-Specific
+
+```mermaid
+graph LR
+
+PosixAccountConsumer("POSIX Account Consumer") --> |"Reads Auths"| PosixAccounts("Posix Accounts")
+```
+
+## Radius
+
+```mermaid
+graph LR
+
+RadiusServiceAdmin("Radius Service Admin") --> |"Adds Members"| RadiusService("Radius Service")
+RadiusService --> |"Reads Secrets"| RadiusAccounts("Radius Accounts")
+RadiusAccountModify("Radius Account Modify") --> |"Writes Secrets"| RadiusAccounts
+```
+
+## Recycle Bin Admin
+
+```mermaid
+graph LR
+
+RecycleBinAdmin("Recycle Bin Admin") --> |"Modifies Reads Revives"| RecycledEntries("Recycled Entries")
+```

book/src/developers/designs/domain_join.md

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+# Domain Join - Machine Accounts
+
+There are a number of features we have been considering that will require us to finally give in and
+support machine accounts also know as domain joining.
+
+## Feature Requirements
+
+### Limiting Unix Password Auth
+
+Currently unix password authentication is targetted as the method for sudo. Initial access to the
+machine should come from ssh keys (and in future, ctap2).
+
+In order to maintain compatability with LDAP style authentication, we allow "anonymous hosts" to
+retrieve ssh public keys, and then perform sudo authentication.
+
+This has the obvious caveat that anyone can stand up a machine that trusts a Kanidm instance. This
+presents a double edged sword:
+
+- By configuring a machine to authenticate via Kanidm, there is full trust
+  in the authentication decisions Kanidm makes.
+- Users of Kanidm may be tricked into accessing a machine that is not managed
+  by their IT or other central authority.
+
+To prevent this, UNIX authentication should be configurable to prevent usage from unregistered machines.
+This will require the machine to present machine authentication credentials simultaneously with the
+user's credentials.
+
+A potential change is removing the current unix password auth mechanism as a whole. Instead the
+user's auth token would contain a TPM bound credential that only the domain joined machine's TPM could
+access and use.
+
+### Requesting Cryptographic Credentials
+
+When a user logs in to a machine, it may be required that they can use that authentication to
+identify themself to other systems. When a user authenticates with credentials such as ssh-keys,
+it's not possible to use these to request other forwardable credentials - and ssh agent forwarding
+only allows forwarding of ssh credentials, not other types of credentials that may be needed.
+
+In this case when a user authenticates with SSH, since they're using a trusted machine, Kanidm can
+request short-term and limited credentials on the users behalf.
+
+An example is that we could dynamically request TLS certificates or Kerberos credentials.
+
+Normally with ssh in this manner, everything has to use kerberos. This would force users to kinit on
+their machine to ssh and forward their credentials to the next machine. This causes friction since
+configuring kerberos on machines is an exercise in frustration, and with BYOD it gets even worse. In
+addition when using ssh with an ssh key, the only viable kinit mechanism is password or password +
+totp once the user has logged in. This is because pkcs11 can't be forwarded over ssh, nor can CTAP2,
+limiting kinit to weaker authentication mechanisms.
+
+## Security Considerations
+
+- Anonymous joins should not be allowed or permitted.
+- Join tokens need to be revoked (causing related machines to request re-enrollment) or expired
+  (related machines can continue to function)
+- Join tokens must be auditable.
+- Private keys SHOULD be stored in a TPM, or at least a software HSM with a secured unlock key.
+- The use of the private key must prevent replay attacks
+
+## Overview
+
+Since the machine would now be an entity requiring authentication, we need to have a process to
+establish and maintain this trust relationship.
+
+1. A join token is created by a user who is authorised to perform domain joins.
+2. The machine is audited for a known trust state. This process may vary from site to site. A future
+   improvement could be that the join token can only release on certain TPM PCR values.
+3. The join token is yielded to the Kanidm UNIX daemon which submits its signing key to the Kanidm
+   server.
+4. The kanidm server verifies the submission and creates a machine account.
+5. The kanidm unix daemon now uses it's signing key to sign a challenge that is submitted with all
+   requests to the kanidm server.
+
+Extra
+
+6. Machines should be able to "re-join" with an alternate join token, moving their machine account
+   join token relationship.
+7. Machines must be able to self-enroll newer keys which may have stronger cryptographic
+   requirements.
+
+## Details
+
+### Join Token Creation
+
+Join tokens are persisted in the database allowing tracing back to the usage of the token.
+
+Every machine that is joined by that token will related back to that token. This allows auditing of
+which token was used to join which machine.
+
+Machines may re-enroll with an alternate token.
+
+The join token should be signed. The JWK pub key should be available at a known HTTPS uri so that
+the client can use it to validate the join token and its content. This _may_ allow policy to be
+embedded into the join token for the client to self-adhere to in the join process.
+
+### Machine Auditing
+
+The machine should be audited to be in a secure state. It's not yet clear how to proceed here, but
+we should consider using TPM PCRs with secure boot to measure this and validate the machine state.
+
+One possible way to achieve this could be with full disk encryption that is bound to secure boot and
+TPM PCRs. Kanidm-unixd could validate the same PCR's to start operating. The challenge here would be
+updates of the expected PCR values during a system update. Alternately, Kanidm could "assume" that
+if started, then the FDE must have passed and attestation of health "is out of scope" for us.
+
+### Public Key Submission
+
+The private key should be generated and stored in a TPM/HSM. If possible, we should also submit
+attestation of this.
+
+The submission of the public key should prevent replays, and should sign either a nonce or the
+current time. The current time must be valid to within a number of seconds. The nonce must be
+created by the server.
+
+The machine must submit its public key, the time value and the signature. This should accompany the
+join token.
+
+If the signature is valid, and the join token is correct, then the machine is joined and has a
+machine account created. The machine account is linked to the join token.
+
+### Machine Account
+
+The machine account is a new form of account, similar to a service account. It should identify the
+machine, its hostname, and other properties. It should also contain the machine's public key id.
+
+When the machine requests certain API's from Kanidm, it should submit signed requests that include
+the current time. The kid is used to find the machine account that is submitting the request. This
+then validates the identity of the caller, and then allows the action to proceed.