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Resolve codespell issues (#1753)
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@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ There are different ways we can scope a trust out, each with pros-cons. Here are
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is no global catalog, just the details you get in the presented authentication (certificate). You
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may implement some controls around which subject DN's to allow/deny, but this is pretty fraught
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with landminds. You don't know who exists until they login!
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* Azure AD individiual account trusting. Instead of trusting a whole domain you allow a user from
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* Azure AD individual account trusting. Instead of trusting a whole domain you allow a user from
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a remote tennant to access your resources. You don't trust everyone in their tennant, just that
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one account that you can invite. You can then revoke them as needed.
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* Group-trust - FreeIPA does this with AD. It's still like kerberos, but you only trust a subset
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@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ server of the change. A psudeo example of this is:
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Summarised, this shows that on our server, our changelog has changes from A for time range
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T4 to T8, B T6 to T16, and C T0 to T7.
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Individiually, a RUV does not allow much, but now we can compare RUVs to another server. Lets
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Individually, a RUV does not allow much, but now we can compare RUVs to another server. Lets
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assume a second server exists with the RUV of:
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::
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@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ impl<'a> IdmServerProxyWriteTransaction<'a> {
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if !eperm_search_primary_cred || !eperm_mod_primary_cred || !eperm_rem_primary_cred {
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security_info!(
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"Requestor {} does not have permission to update credentials of {}",
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"Requester {} does not have permission to update credentials of {}",
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ident,
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account.spn
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);
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@ -2244,7 +2244,7 @@ mod tests {
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== Oauth2Error::InvalidClientId
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);
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// * mis match origin in the redirect.
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// * mismatched origin in the redirect.
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let auth_req = AuthorisationRequest {
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response_type: "code".to_string(),
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client_id: "test_resource_server".to_string(),
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@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ impl<'a> IdmServerProxyWriteTransaction<'a> {
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if !eperm.delete {
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security_info!(
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"Requestor {} does not have permission to delete sync account {}",
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"Requester {} does not have permission to delete sync account {}",
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sfe.ident,
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sync_account.name
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);
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@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ impl<'a> IdmServerProxyWriteTransaction<'a> {
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if !eperm.delete {
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security_info!(
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"Requestor {} does not have permission to delete sync account {}",
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"Requester {} does not have permission to delete sync account {}",
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ste.ident,
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sync_account.name
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);
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@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ pub enum Access {
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub struct AccessEffectivePermission {
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// I don't think we need this? The ident is implied by the requestor.
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// I don't think we need this? The ident is implied by the requester.
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// ident: Uuid,
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pub target: Uuid,
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pub delete: bool,
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