Resolve codespell issues (#1753)

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Firstyear 2023-06-20 13:19:21 +10:00 committed by GitHub
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6 changed files with 7 additions and 7 deletions

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@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ There are different ways we can scope a trust out, each with pros-cons. Here are
is no global catalog, just the details you get in the presented authentication (certificate). You
may implement some controls around which subject DN's to allow/deny, but this is pretty fraught
with landminds. You don't know who exists until they login!
* Azure AD individiual account trusting. Instead of trusting a whole domain you allow a user from
* Azure AD individual account trusting. Instead of trusting a whole domain you allow a user from
a remote tennant to access your resources. You don't trust everyone in their tennant, just that
one account that you can invite. You can then revoke them as needed.
* Group-trust - FreeIPA does this with AD. It's still like kerberos, but you only trust a subset

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@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ server of the change. A psudeo example of this is:
Summarised, this shows that on our server, our changelog has changes from A for time range
T4 to T8, B T6 to T16, and C T0 to T7.
Individiually, a RUV does not allow much, but now we can compare RUVs to another server. Lets
Individually, a RUV does not allow much, but now we can compare RUVs to another server. Lets
assume a second server exists with the RUV of:
::

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@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ impl<'a> IdmServerProxyWriteTransaction<'a> {
if !eperm_search_primary_cred || !eperm_mod_primary_cred || !eperm_rem_primary_cred {
security_info!(
"Requestor {} does not have permission to update credentials of {}",
"Requester {} does not have permission to update credentials of {}",
ident,
account.spn
);

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@ -2244,7 +2244,7 @@ mod tests {
== Oauth2Error::InvalidClientId
);
// * mis match origin in the redirect.
// * mismatched origin in the redirect.
let auth_req = AuthorisationRequest {
response_type: "code".to_string(),
client_id: "test_resource_server".to_string(),

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@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ impl<'a> IdmServerProxyWriteTransaction<'a> {
if !eperm.delete {
security_info!(
"Requestor {} does not have permission to delete sync account {}",
"Requester {} does not have permission to delete sync account {}",
sfe.ident,
sync_account.name
);
@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ impl<'a> IdmServerProxyWriteTransaction<'a> {
if !eperm.delete {
security_info!(
"Requestor {} does not have permission to delete sync account {}",
"Requester {} does not have permission to delete sync account {}",
ste.ident,
sync_account.name
);

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@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ pub enum Access {
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct AccessEffectivePermission {
// I don't think we need this? The ident is implied by the requestor.
// I don't think we need this? The ident is implied by the requester.
// ident: Uuid,
pub target: Uuid,
pub delete: bool,