mirror of
https://github.com/kanidm/kanidm.git
synced 2025-02-23 12:37:00 +01:00
docs(faq): Discuss options for TLS between LB and kanidm
This commit is contained in:
parent
ef2701687e
commit
cc9433fbd4
|
@ -37,6 +37,19 @@ practice. This can allow account hijacking, privilege escalation, credential dis
|
||||||
information leaks and more. The entire path between a client and the server must be protected at all
|
information leaks and more. The entire path between a client and the server must be protected at all
|
||||||
times.
|
times.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
There are a variety of ways that you can configure TLS between your load balancer and Kanidm.
|
||||||
|
Ultimately, any option that maintains the confidentiality and integrity of the communication will
|
||||||
|
suffice. Some options include, but are not limited to:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Generating a self-signed certificate
|
||||||
|
- Utilize certificate pinning to ensure that the load balancer only trusts connections made with
|
||||||
|
that particular certificate
|
||||||
|
- Not terminating TLS / TLS passthrough / TCP proxy
|
||||||
|
- Running your own certificate authority (CA)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The "best" option for you will depend on a number of factors, including your threat model and the
|
||||||
|
specifc load balancer you are using.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## OAuth2
|
## OAuth2
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
[RFC6819 - OAuth2 Threat Model and Security Considerations](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6819)
|
[RFC6819 - OAuth2 Threat Model and Security Considerations](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6819)
|
||||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in a new issue