Merge 490a6caa18 into f40679cd52

* Add accept-invalid-certs option for cli
* Fix token_cache_path behavior

---------

Co-authored-by: sinavir <sinavir@sinavir.fr>

book/src/integrations/oauth2.md

@@ -458,27 +458,24 @@ Each client has unique signing keys and access secrets, so this is limited to ea
 
 ## WebFinger
 
-> [!NOTE]
->
-> WebFinger support requires Kanidm v1.5.1 or later.
-
-[WebFinger](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7033) provides a mechanism
-for discovering information about entities at a well-known URL
-(`http://example.com/.well-known/webfinger`).
+[WebFinger][webfinger] provides a mechanism for discovering information about
+entities at a well-known URL (`https://{hostname}/.well-known/webfinger`).
 
 It can be used by a WebFinger client to
-[discover the OIDC issuer URL](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7033#section-3.1)
-of an identity provider from the hostname alone, and seems to be intended to
-support dynamic client registration flows for large public identity providers.
+[discover the OIDC issuer URL][webfinger-oidc] of an identity provider from the
+hostname alone, and seems to be intended to support dynamic client registration
+flows for large public identity providers.
 
 Kanidm v1.5.1 and later can respond to WebFinger requests, using a user's SPN as
-the account (eg: `user@idm.example.com`). This *does not* match on email
-addresses, because they are not required by Kanidm nor guaranteed to be unique.
+part of [an `acct` URI][rfc7565] (eg: `acct:user@idm.example.com`). While SPNs
+and `acct` URIs look like email addresses, [as per RFC 7565][rfc7565s4], there
+is no guarantee that it is valid for any particular application protocol, unless
+an administrator explicitly provides for it.
 
-When setting up an (enterprise) application to authenticate with Kanidm,
-WebFinger **does not add any security** over configuring an OpenID Discovery
-URL directly. In an OIDC context, the specification makes a number of flawed
-assumptions which make it difficult to use with Kanidm:
+When setting up an application to authenticate with Kanidm, WebFinger **does not
+add any security** over configuring an OpenID Discovery URL directly. In an OIDC
+context, the specification makes a number of flawed assumptions which make it
+difficult to use with Kanidm:
 
 * WebFinger assumes that the identity provider will give the same `iss`
   (issuer) and OpenID Discovery document, including all URLs and signing keys,
@@ -486,11 +483,11 @@ assumptions which make it difficult to use with Kanidm:
 
   Kanidm uses *different* `iss` (issuer), signing keys, and some client-specific
   endpoint URLs, which ensures that tokens can only be used with their intended
-  service. *Changing this behaviour would reduce Kanidm's security.*
+  service.
 
 * WebFinger endpoints must be served at the *root* of the domain of a user's
   SPN (ie: information about the user with SPN `user@idm.example.com` is at
-  `https://idm.example.com/.well-known/webfinger?resource=acct%3Auser%40idm.example.com&rel=...`).
+  `https://idm.example.com/.well-known/webfinger?resource=acct%3Auser%40idm.example.com`).
 
   Unlike OIDC Discovery, WebFinger clients do not report their OAuth 2.0/OIDC
   client ID in the request, so there is no way to tell them apart.
@@ -517,19 +514,28 @@ assumptions which make it difficult to use with Kanidm:
   to a client ID, and redirect to the appropriate WebFinger URL for that client.
 
 * Kanidm responds to *all* WebFinger queries with
-  [an Identity Provider Discovery for OIDC URL](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7033#section-3.1),
-  **ignoring** any supplied
-  [`rel` parameter](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7033#section-4.3).
+  [an Identity Provider Discovery for OIDC URL][webfinger-oidc], **ignoring**
+  any supplied [`rel` parameter][webfinger-rel].
 
   If you want to use WebFinger in any *other* context on Kanidm's hostname,
   you'll need a load balancer in front of Kanidm which matches on some property
   of the request.
 
-  WebFinger clients *may* omit the `rel=` parameter, so if another service has
-  relations for an `acct:` entity and a client *does not* supply the `rel=`
-  parameter, your load balancer will need to merge JSON responses from Kanidm
-  and the other service(s).
+  WebFinger clients *may* omit the `rel=` parameter, so if you host another
+  service with relations for a Kanidm [`acct:` entity][rfc7565s4] and a client
+  *does not* supply the `rel=` parameter, your load balancer will need to merge
+  JSON responses from Kanidm and the other service(s).
 
-Because of these issues, we recommend that (enterprise) applications support
-*directly* configuring OIDC using a Discovery URL or OAuth 2.0 Authorisation
-Server Metadata URL instead of WebFinger.
+Because of these issues, we recommend that applications support *directly*
+configuring OIDC using a Discovery URL or OAuth 2.0 Authorisation Server
+Metadata URL instead of WebFinger.
+
+If a WebFinger client only checks WebFinger once during setup, you may wish to
+temporarily serve an appropriate static WebFinger document for that client
+instead.
+
+[rfc7565]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7565
+[rfc7565s4]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7565#section-4
+[webfinger]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7033
+[webfinger-oidc]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7033#section-3.1
+[webfinger-rel]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7033#section-4.3

libs/client/src/lib.rs

@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ pub struct KanidmClientConfigInstance {
     pub verify_hostnames: Option<bool>,
     /// Whether to verify the Certificate Authority details of the server's TLS certificate, defaults to `true`.
     ///
-    /// Environment variable is slightly inverted - `KANIDM_SKIP_HOSTNAME_VERIFICATION`.
+    /// Environment variable is slightly inverted - `KANIDM_ACCEPT_INVALID_CERTS`.
     pub verify_ca: Option<bool>,
     /// Optionally you can specify the path of a CA certificate to use for verifying the server, if you're not using one trusted by your system certificate store.
     ///
@@ -453,6 +453,13 @@ impl KanidmClientBuilder {
         }
     }
 
+    pub fn set_token_cache_path(self, token_cache_path: Option<String>) -> Self {
+        KanidmClientBuilder {
+            token_cache_path,
+            ..self
+        }
+    }
+
     #[allow(clippy::result_unit_err)]
     pub fn add_root_certificate_filepath(self, ca_path: &str) -> Result<Self, ClientError> {
         //Okay we have a ca to add. Let's read it in and setup.

libs/crypto/src/lib.rs

@@ -662,9 +662,13 @@ impl TryFrom<&str> for Password {
             });
         }
 
-        // Test 389ds formats
+        // Test 389ds/openldap formats. Shout outs openldap which sometimes makes these
+        // lowercase.
 
-        if let Some(ds_ssha1) = value.strip_prefix("{SHA}") {
+        if let Some(ds_ssha1) = value
+            .strip_prefix("{SHA}")
+            .or_else(|| value.strip_prefix("{sha}"))
+        {
             let h = general_purpose::STANDARD.decode(ds_ssha1).map_err(|_| ())?;
             if h.len() != DS_SHA1_HASH_LEN {
                 return Err(());
@@ -674,7 +678,10 @@ impl TryFrom<&str> for Password {
             });
         }
 
-        if let Some(ds_ssha1) = value.strip_prefix("{SSHA}") {
+        if let Some(ds_ssha1) = value
+            .strip_prefix("{SSHA}")
+            .or_else(|| value.strip_prefix("{ssha}"))
+        {
             let sh = general_purpose::STANDARD.decode(ds_ssha1).map_err(|_| ())?;
             let (h, s) = sh.split_at(DS_SHA1_HASH_LEN);
             if s.len() != DS_SHA_SALT_LEN {
@@ -685,7 +692,10 @@ impl TryFrom<&str> for Password {
             });
         }
 
-        if let Some(ds_ssha256) = value.strip_prefix("{SHA256}") {
+        if let Some(ds_ssha256) = value
+            .strip_prefix("{SHA256}")
+            .or_else(|| value.strip_prefix("{sha256}"))
+        {
             let h = general_purpose::STANDARD
                 .decode(ds_ssha256)
                 .map_err(|_| ())?;
@@ -697,7 +707,10 @@ impl TryFrom<&str> for Password {
             });
         }
 
-        if let Some(ds_ssha256) = value.strip_prefix("{SSHA256}") {
+        if let Some(ds_ssha256) = value
+            .strip_prefix("{SSHA256}")
+            .or_else(|| value.strip_prefix("{ssha256}"))
+        {
             let sh = general_purpose::STANDARD
                 .decode(ds_ssha256)
                 .map_err(|_| ())?;
@@ -710,7 +723,10 @@ impl TryFrom<&str> for Password {
             });
         }
 
-        if let Some(ds_ssha512) = value.strip_prefix("{SHA512}") {
+        if let Some(ds_ssha512) = value
+            .strip_prefix("{SHA512}")
+            .or_else(|| value.strip_prefix("{sha512}"))
+        {
             let h = general_purpose::STANDARD
                 .decode(ds_ssha512)
                 .map_err(|_| ())?;
@@ -722,7 +738,10 @@ impl TryFrom<&str> for Password {
             });
         }
 
-        if let Some(ds_ssha512) = value.strip_prefix("{SSHA512}") {
+        if let Some(ds_ssha512) = value
+            .strip_prefix("{SSHA512}")
+            .or_else(|| value.strip_prefix("{ssha512}"))
+        {
             let sh = general_purpose::STANDARD
                 .decode(ds_ssha512)
                 .map_err(|_| ())?;
@@ -1441,8 +1460,12 @@ mod tests {
     #[test]
     fn test_password_from_ds_sha1() {
         let im_pw = "{SHA}W6ph5Mm5Pz8GgiULbPgzG37mj9g=";
+        let _r = Password::try_from(im_pw).expect("Failed to parse");
+
+        let im_pw = "{sha}W6ph5Mm5Pz8GgiULbPgzG37mj9g=";
         let password = "password";
         let r = Password::try_from(im_pw).expect("Failed to parse");
+
         // Known weak, require upgrade.
         assert!(r.requires_upgrade());
         assert!(r.verify(password).unwrap_or(false));
@@ -1451,8 +1474,12 @@ mod tests {
     #[test]
     fn test_password_from_ds_ssha1() {
         let im_pw = "{SSHA}EyzbBiP4u4zxOrLpKTORI/RX3HC6TCTJtnVOCQ==";
+        let _r = Password::try_from(im_pw).expect("Failed to parse");
+
+        let im_pw = "{ssha}EyzbBiP4u4zxOrLpKTORI/RX3HC6TCTJtnVOCQ==";
         let password = "password";
         let r = Password::try_from(im_pw).expect("Failed to parse");
+
         // Known weak, require upgrade.
         assert!(r.requires_upgrade());
         assert!(r.verify(password).unwrap_or(false));
@@ -1461,8 +1488,12 @@ mod tests {
     #[test]
     fn test_password_from_ds_sha256() {
         let im_pw = "{SHA256}XohImNooBHFR0OVvjcYpJ3NgPQ1qq73WKhHvch0VQtg=";
+        let _r = Password::try_from(im_pw).expect("Failed to parse");
+
+        let im_pw = "{sha256}XohImNooBHFR0OVvjcYpJ3NgPQ1qq73WKhHvch0VQtg=";
         let password = "password";
         let r = Password::try_from(im_pw).expect("Failed to parse");
+
         // Known weak, require upgrade.
         assert!(r.requires_upgrade());
         assert!(r.verify(password).unwrap_or(false));
@@ -1471,8 +1502,12 @@ mod tests {
     #[test]
     fn test_password_from_ds_ssha256() {
         let im_pw = "{SSHA256}luYWfFJOZgxySTsJXHgIaCYww4yMpu6yest69j/wO5n5OycuHFV/GQ==";
+        let _r = Password::try_from(im_pw).expect("Failed to parse");
+
+        let im_pw = "{ssha256}luYWfFJOZgxySTsJXHgIaCYww4yMpu6yest69j/wO5n5OycuHFV/GQ==";
         let password = "password";
         let r = Password::try_from(im_pw).expect("Failed to parse");
+
         // Known weak, require upgrade.
         assert!(r.requires_upgrade());
         assert!(r.verify(password).unwrap_or(false));
@@ -1481,8 +1516,12 @@ mod tests {
     #[test]
     fn test_password_from_ds_sha512() {
         let im_pw = "{SHA512}sQnzu7wkTrgkQZF+0G1hi5AI3Qmzvv0bXgc5THBqi7mAsdd4Xll27ASbRt9fEyavWi6m0QP9B8lThf+rDKy8hg==";
+        let _r = Password::try_from(im_pw).expect("Failed to parse");
+
+        let im_pw = "{sha512}sQnzu7wkTrgkQZF+0G1hi5AI3Qmzvv0bXgc5THBqi7mAsdd4Xll27ASbRt9fEyavWi6m0QP9B8lThf+rDKy8hg==";
         let password = "password";
         let r = Password::try_from(im_pw).expect("Failed to parse");
+
         // Known weak, require upgrade.
         assert!(r.requires_upgrade());
         assert!(r.verify(password).unwrap_or(false));
@@ -1491,8 +1530,12 @@ mod tests {
     #[test]
     fn test_password_from_ds_ssha512() {
         let im_pw = "{SSHA512}JwrSUHkI7FTAfHRVR6KoFlSN0E3dmaQWARjZ+/UsShYlENOqDtFVU77HJLLrY2MuSp0jve52+pwtdVl2QUAHukQ0XUf5LDtM";
+        let _r = Password::try_from(im_pw).expect("Failed to parse");
+
+        let im_pw = "{ssha512}JwrSUHkI7FTAfHRVR6KoFlSN0E3dmaQWARjZ+/UsShYlENOqDtFVU77HJLLrY2MuSp0jve52+pwtdVl2QUAHukQ0XUf5LDtM";
         let password = "password";
         let r = Password::try_from(im_pw).expect("Failed to parse");
+
         // Known weak, require upgrade.
         assert!(r.requires_upgrade());
         assert!(r.verify(password).unwrap_or(false));

tools/cli/src/cli/common.rs

@@ -91,6 +91,18 @@ impl CommonOpt {
             false => client_builder,
         };
 
+        let client_builder = match self.accept_invalid_certs {
+            true => {
+                warn!(
+                    "TLS Certificate Verification disabled!!! This can lead to credential and account compromise!!!"
+                );
+                client_builder.danger_accept_invalid_certs(true)
+            }
+            false => client_builder,
+        };
+
+        let client_builder = client_builder.set_token_cache_path(self.token_cache_path.clone());
+
         client_builder.build().unwrap_or_else(|e| {
             error!("Failed to build client instance -- {:?}", e);
             std::process::exit(1);

tools/cli/src/opt/kanidm.rs

@@ -87,6 +87,13 @@ pub struct CommonOpt {
         default_value_t = false
     )]
     skip_hostname_verification: bool,
+    /// Don't verify CA
+    #[clap(
+        long = "accept-invalid-certs",
+        env = "KANIDM_ACCEPT_INVALID_CERTS",
+        default_value_t = false
+    )]
+    accept_invalid_certs: bool,
     /// Path to a file to cache tokens in, defaults to ~/.cache/kanidm_tokens
     #[clap(short, long, env = "KANIDM_TOKEN_CACHE_PATH", hide = true, default_value = None,
     value_parser = clap::builder::NonEmptyStringValueParser::new())]