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book/src/developers/designs/service_accounts.md

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+# Service Account Improvements - 2025
+
+Initially when service accounts were added to Kanidm they were simply meant to be "detached"
+accounts that could be used for some API access to Kani, or some other background tasks.
+
+But as the server has evolved we need to consider how we can use these in other ways.
+
+We have extented the OAuth2 client types to now almost act like a service account, especially
+with the behaviour of things like a client credentials grant.
+
+At this point we need to decide how to proceed with service accounts and what shape they could
+take in the future.
+
+## Prior Art
+
+* (Microsoft AD-DS Service Accounts)[https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-service-accounts]
+* (FreeIPA Service Principals)[https://www.freeipa.org/page/Administrators_Guide#managing-service-principals]
+
+Note that both of these have some kerberos centric ideas as KRB requires service accounts to mutually
+authenticate to clients, which means they need to maintain credentials. This is different to our needs,
+but there are still some ideas in these docs worth knowing about and considering like group managed
+service accounts (gMSA).
+
+## Current state of affairs
+
+We have:
+
+* Break glass accounts are service accounts, may not have delegated management.
+* OAuth2 is not a service account, supports delegated management.
+* Service accounts can be group or user managed.
+* Applications (To Be Introduced) is an extension of a Service account.
+
+From this we can see that we have some separation, but also some cross over of functionality.
+break glass isn't delegated, but service account is, OAuth2 isn't an SA, but Applications are.
+
+## Capabilities
+
+In order to properly handle this, we don't want to grant unbounded abilities to types, we don't
+want to fully merge them, but we want to be able to mix-match what they require.
+
+This also makes it possible in the future that we can more easily assign (or remove) a capability
+from an account type.
+
+To achieve this we should introduce the idea of capabilities - capabilities can act via schema
+classes, and we can extend the schema such that only the parent class needs to know that the
+capabilities class is required.
+
+This allows us to nominate more carefully what each role type can or can't do, and keeps things
+
+| Capabilities    | Api Token        | OAuth2 Sessions              | Interactive Login   |
+|-----------------|------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|
+| OAuth2          | No               | Via Client Credentials Grant | No                  |
+| Application     | Yes (ro)         | No                           | No                  |
+| Service Account | Yes (rw capable) | Yes (via session grant (TBD) | Yes (to be removed) |
+| Machine Account | Yes (ro)         | No                           | No                  |
+| Break Glass     | No               | No                           | Yes                 |
+| Person          | No               | Yes                          | Yes                 |
+
+A key requirement of this is that we want each role to have a defined intent - it shouldn't be
+the everything role, it still needs to be focused and administered in it's own right.
+
+|                 | Intent                                                                                                                                                                                    |
+|-----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| OAuth2          | An OAuth2 client (external server/service) that is treating Kani as the IDP it trusts to validate user authorisation to it's resources.                                                   |
+| Application     | An LDAP application password context, allowing per-user/per-device/per-application passwords to validated, as well as defining group based authorisation of whom may use this application |
+| Service Account | An account that belongs to a process or automation that needs to read from or write to Kanidm, or a Kanidm related service.                                                               |
+| Machine Account | A domain joined machine that is reads user posix or login information. May be used to configure machine service accounts in future.                                                       |
+| Break Glass     | An emergency access account used in disaster recovery.                                                                                                                                    |
+| Person          | A humans owned account that needs to authenticate day to day, and self manage their own credentials. A person may need to manage other accounts and resource types                        |
+
+This has the benefit that it makes it easier to assign the permissions via ACP (since we can filter
+on the Target class *and* capability type).
+
+### Example
+
+An Email service has an SMTP gateway and OAuth2 web ui.
+
+Although this is "the email service" it is made up of multiple parts that each have their own intents.
+
+The Webui has an Oauth2 client created to define the relationship of who may access the webui.
+
+An LDAP application is made to allow IMAP/SMTP processes to authenticate users with application passwords and
+to read users PII via LDAP.
+
+## Below was the drafting process of some ideas
+
+### Attach roles to service accounts.
+
+In this approach we centre the service account, and allow optional extension of other concerns. This
+would make OAuth2 applications an extension of a service account. Similar Application as well.
+
+This would mean that we create a service account first, then need a way to extend it with the
+application or oauth2 types.
+
+PROS:
+
+* OAuth2 applications get the ability to have api tokens to kani for other functionality
+* Fullstacks like a mail server get a single SA that does everything
+* These whole stack service accounts get access to every auth type and feature available
+
+CONS:
+
+* Makes the API around service accounts a bit messier
+* Compromise of the SA or SA Manager may lead to higher impact due to more features in one place
+* May be confusing to administrators
+* More "inheritance" of schema classes, when we may want to try to simplify to single classes in line with SCIM.
+* Harder to audit capabilities
+* The administration UI becomes a shitshow as the Service Account is now a kitchen sink.
+
+### Separate Concerns
+
+In this approach we split our concerns. This is similar to today, but taken a bit further.
+
+In this example, we would split Application to *just* be about the concern of an authentication
+domain for LDAP applications. OAuth2 stays as *just* a configuration of the client and it's behaviour.
+
+We would change the break glass accounts to be a separate type to Service Account. Service Account
+becomes closer to the concept of a pure api access account. The break glass accounts become a
+dedicated "emergency access account" type.
+
+PROS:
+
+* Similar to today, only small cleanup needed
+* Separation of concerns and credentials limit's blast radius of a possible compromise.
+* Easier auditing of capabilities of each account
+
+CONS:
+
+* More administrative overhead to manage the multiple accounts
+* Stacked applications will need mulitple configurations for a role - OAuth2, LDAP application, Service accounts for example in an email server with a WebUI.
+
+### Bit of A, bit of B, cleanup
+
+AKA Capabilities
+
+Rather than fully merge all the types, or fully split them, have a *little* merge of some bits, allowing
+some limited extension of actions to specific actors. Effectively we end up granting *capabilities*
+to different roles, and we can add extra capabilities later if we want.
+
+OAuth2 and Applications would gain the ability to have API tokens associated for some tasks and
+could act on Kanidm, but they wouldn't be fully fleshed service accounts.
+
+| Capabilities    | Api Token        | OAuth2 Sessions              | Interactive Login   |
+|-----------------|------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|
+| OAuth2          | No               | Via Client Credentials Grant | No                  |
+| Application     | Yes              | No                           | No                  |
+| Service Account | Yes (rw capable) | Yes (via session grant (TBD) | Yes (to be removed) |
+| Break Glass     | No               | No                           | Yes                 |
+
+PROS:
+
+* Minimises changes to existing deployments
+* Grants some new abilities within limits to other roles
+* While not as locked down as separate concern proposal, still minimises the risk of compromise of an SA
+
+CONS:
+
+* Requires admins to have multiple accounts in some contexts (as above).
+* Auditing requires knowledge of what each roles capabilities are, and what the capabilities do
+
+