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61 lines
2.8 KiB
ReStructuredText
61 lines
2.8 KiB
ReStructuredText
System Protected Objects
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------------------------
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There are a number of system provided objects and functions that are important
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for correct operation of the server. It's important we protect these from certain
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types of modifications so that the system has a baseline of correct functionality.
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Some of this is protected by the migrations system built into the server, which
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will correct and "set" certain items to a known state on startup. However, like
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all IDM systems, downtime/restarts are rare, so we have to account for human
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error and provide constraints to maintain a healthy running system.
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What needs protecting?
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----------------------
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The current list (july 2019) is:
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* Core schema (enough to make attributetypes/classtypes/memberof/acp operate)
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* Anonymous
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* Admin
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* systeminfo
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Additionally, the scope of protection is limited - or rather, the scope of what is
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allowed.
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* New system protected items can only be created via internal operations, preventing
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accidental creation of these.
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* schema classtypes can have must/may altered on classes
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* schema attributetypes can have index altered on classes
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* anonymous can be locked
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* admin can be locked, and password changed (or other credentials changed).
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The plugin design
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-----------------
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This should be a plugin, as the hooks exist in the correct places to intercept and block
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the required operations, saving custom coding. The plugin will:
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* Block any create on "class": "system".
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* Block any delete on "class": "system".
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* Block modify to "class": "system" where the affect attr is NOT in the allowed mod set.
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The modify block will not be class aware, because schema protects us from other odd behaviours.
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An example - addition of account lock to a schema element. This would be "allowed" by this plugin
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because account lock will be in the allowed set for system, but schema would not allow addition
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of accountlock to a schema element thus protecting us. Because class will NEVER be in the
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allowed set for a system protected type, we can trust that these bounds won't be exceeded.
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Why not ACP?
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------------
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It was considered to provide default ACP's that would protect system items. This was rejected because:
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* it would require a "deny" acp type, and I do not wish to create this, as people could then create their own deny rules (always incorrect!)
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* There would be a lot of acp's involved in this protection (but acp's are expressive enough to provide it!)
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* The acp's would need a self-referencing acp to protect themselves from modification.
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* Having a separate plugin to protect this will be faster than acp processing because we check less filters (But this is not a strong argument)
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* the plugin can provide targeted error messages about why they were denied, rather than a generic acp denied message.
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* the plugin can provide detailed testing of edge cases in a confined manner
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